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CLASS CONFLICT, FISCAL POLICY, AND WAGE-LED 
DEMAND: A MODEL OF KALECKI’S POLITICAL 
BUSINESS CYCLE
Giorgos Gouzoulis, Collin Constantine1
ABSTRACT This paper provides a demand-driven growth model of Kalecki’s 
(1943) political business cycle. It incorporates the three fundamental assumptions 
that govern Kalecki’s model: wage-led demand, the “reserve army of  labor” 
effect, and capitalists’ disproportionate power over fiscal policy. In our model, 
endogenous cycles are the outcome of capitalists’ changing preferences over fiscal 
policy. Decreasing opposition to fiscal expansion by capitalists triggers the boom 
phase of the cycle, lest demand deficiency lead to a slowdown in accumulation. The 
downturn of the cycle is induced by capitalists’ rising opposition to government 
spending, lest workers’ growing political power at the peak of the cycle undermine 
their influence. This approach is unlike that taken by Goodwin and neoclassical 
PBC models, where a profit squeeze and the timing of elections or political 
ideologies determine cycles.
KEYWORDS: political business cycle, class struggle, income distribution
INTRODUCTION 
The role of politics has been largely overlooked in the field of macroeconomic 
theory during the last decades. Even within the political economy tradition, 
where class conflict between capitalists and workers is central, little has been 
said about the capitalist-government nexus and its impact on macroeconomic 
performance and endogenous crises. This becomes even more evident in the 
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macroeconomic modelling literature where political factors are absent. Even 
the heterodox political economy modelling literature implicitly supports the 
state-economy dualism perspective, which considers the political system as 
exogenous to the economy (Bandelj and Sowers 2010). This article contributes 
to the literature by providing the first formal macroeconomic model of Kalecki’s 
(1943) political business cycle (PBC) to explicitly build on the state-economy 
embeddedness assumption.
In contrast to neoclassical scholars, political economists do recognize the 
endogenous nature of crises and business cycles. So far, formal macroeconomic 
models of endogenous crises have focused solely on economic factors, without 
introducing explicitly political economy factors. Examples of such models are 
the Marxian profit squeeze cycle of Goodwin (1967) and the debt crises models 
that originate in the work of Minsky (Nikolaidi 2017). Kalecki (1943) is the only 
exception within the literature to argue that macroeconomic instability can also 
arise endogenously due to political factors, under the following assumptions: 
capitalists’ disproportionate power over fiscal policy, wage-led demand, and the 
Marxian “reserve army of labor” effect. Capitalists’ decreasing opposition to 
fiscal expansion triggers the boom phase of the cycle, lest demand deficiency 
lead to a slowdown in accumulation. The downturn of the cycle is induced by 
capitalists’ rising opposition to government spending, lest workers’ growing 
political power at the peak of the cycle undermine their influence. Nevertheless, 
Kalecki did not provide a formal model of his class-conflict-driven PBC, thus 
the recent PBC models are built on the interpretations of Nordhaus (1975) and 
Hibbs (1977). These neoclassical micro-founded models reject Kalecki’s core 
hypotheses, contending that PBCs are driven by exogenous factors, such as 
election cycles and political parties’ partisan preferences (Dubois 2016). This 
constitutes a major departure from Kalecki (1943). From a political economy 
perspective these models introduce the role of politics but are clearly based on 
the state-economy dualism rather than on the state-economy embeddedness 
perspective. Recently, Blyth and Matthijs (2017) have highlighted the importance 
of Kalecki’s (1943) PBC and recognize its endogenous nature, but they provide 
neither a precise analysis of its channels nor a formal model. This paper fills this 
gap in the literature. 
Our paper provides a precise description and a simple formal macroeconomic 
model of our interpretation of Kalecki’s original PBC, incorporating capitalists’ 
socio-economic uncertainty and their power over fiscal policy into a wage-
led aggregate demand model. Thus, only political factors can endogenously 
destabilize the system. The cycles occur as capitalists manipulate fiscal policy 
to preserve the current favorable institutional setting, balancing between 
economic and political uncertainty. Our contribution is non-trivial since it 
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offers a political-economy, non-profit-squeeze explanation of the 1970’s crisis 
and the corresponding welfare state retrenchment, and the rise of neoliberalism. 
Moreover, such a general model is fundamental to understanding the dynamics 
of contemporary capitalism as it relates to the rise of Super Political Action 
Committees in the USA, growing recognition of the ability of firms to sue 
governments, and the increasing importance of money in politics.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The second section examines 
the evolution of the PBC literature. The third section interprets Kalecki’s (1943) 
PBC as an endogenous crisis theory in the context of a static demand-driven 
macroeconomic model. The fourth section discusses the empirical relevance of 
our model and its implications for the growth model perspective in a comparative 
political economy. Finally, the fifth section concludes.
POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES: FROM KALECKI TO 
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
More than seventy years ago, Kalecki’s (1943) seminal article Political aspects 
of full employment became the cornerstone of PBC research.2 Based on the 
wage-led demand regime and the “reserve army of labor” hypothesis, Kalecki 
attempted to descriptively outline a behavioral endogenous business cycle 
mechanism in which growth is driven by capitalists’ ever-changing preferences 
for government intervention, which in turn influence the political balance of 
power, and vice versa. A few decades later, Nordhaus (1975) endeavored – for 
the first time – to formally model a PBC, focusing more on the microeconomic 
level. More specifically, according to this neoclassical model cycles are generated 
by individual voters’ adaptive preferences about unemployment and inflation, 
and their relationship with election cycles, given a policy-neutral government. 
Subsequently, Hibbs (1977) relaxes Nordhaus’ restrictive assumption based 
on the policy neutrality of government by introducing the impact of political 
parties’ ideological preferences on unemployment and inflation. The aim of 
this section is, first, to clarify the “mechanics” of Kalecki’s PBC, and then to 
highlight its major discrepancies compared to the relevant neoclassical models.
2  Peculiarly enough, the relevant article in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2008) 
does not even mention Kalecki, in spite of Nordhaus’ (1975) explicit acknowledgement of his 
contribution.
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Political aspects of full employment
The original version of Kalecki’s article appeared in The Political Quarterly 
in 1943, while a slightly revised version was included in his Selected Essays on 
the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy (Kalecki 1971). Compared to his more 
mature writings (e.g. Kalecki 1954), this work depicts a different viewpoint of 
Kalecki’s macroeconomics analysis following a less formal economistic but 
more interdisciplinary approach, heavily relying upon class-based, political 
microfoundations. In particular, his PBC mechanism does offer crucial 
theoretical insights into the dependency relationship between capitalists and the 
government, and into the political-uncertainty-macroeconomy-class conflict 
nexus, building on the general principles of his wage-led demand assumption.
Kalecki begins his analysis by stating that achieving full employment via 
government spending is technically feasible and also enhances macroeconomic 
stability, given a wage-led demand regime (Kalecki 1943, p. 324). From a purely 
economistic perspective, such a scenario benefits both social classes. However, 
in a real-world, complex socio-economic system, decisions and preferences are 
not formed solely on the basis of (macro)economic performance. According to 
Kalecki (ibid.), capitalists’ stance concerning government intervention depends 
on several ideological and political aspects, such as: (i) Their idealistic opposition 
to the direct interference of the government in the labor market; (ii) Their dislike 
of government spending programs that include public investment and mass 
consumption subsidies; and (iii) Their fear that permanent full employment 
will trigger major social and political changes, leaving aside the positive growth 
effects. To analyze the dynamics of his political business cycle model, Kalecki 
describes the underlying behavioral norms and their macroeconomic and 
political implications but without providing a formal model.
Starting from the downward phase of the cycle, employment, wages, and 
the rate of growth of the economy steadily decrease. At this point, even the 
most dogmatic capitalists agree that government must intervene to overcome 
this plateau (Kalecki 1943, p. 328). Their initial demand is that government – 
supported by their “economic experts” – should stimulate private investment 
through supply-side policies, which in Kalecki’s demand-driven framework 
fails to sustainably boost growth.3 Given the failure of the supply-side stimulus, 
the recession deepens and reaches a stagnation stage, in which even profit 
realization issues arise. Under these conditions, capitalists realize that a demand 
boost is needed; therefore, they consent to a rise in public investment to fight 
3  Kalecki reasonably argues that, even from a purely supply-side perspective, such a policy program 
cannot be effective since interest rates or income taxes – by definition – cannot be ever decreasing.
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unemployment (Kalecki 1943, p. 329). Kalecki also contends that capitalists, in 
principle, prefer public investment rather than consumption subsidies, since the 
latter violate the fundamentalist free-market ideal according to which workers 
“…shall earn [their] bread in sweat”4 (Kalecki 1943, p. 326). In this regard, 
two observations can be made: First, government can exercise both supply and 
demand-side policies, but its ability to choose and implement them depends on 
capitalists’ preferences; Second, for pragmatic reasons capitalists’ ideological 
opposition to demand-side intervention falls in periods of secular stagnation. 
Following Kalecki’s rationale, let us suppose that public investment has a 
positive impact on employment and real wages due to the diminishing reserve 
army effect (ibid.). Given the wage-led demand hypothesis, the rise in real wages 
boosts growth and engenders a wage-led sustainable recovery. In a profit-led 
demand framework, a crisis would occur in the form of a profit squeeze, since 
a rising wage share depletes firms’ internal sources of finance. However, in 
Kalecki’s wage-led demand framework, a profit squeeze crisis cannot occur. 
Thus the question: what are the endogenous forces that generate cycles in a wage-
led regime? Assuming a successful public-driven, wage-led recovery scenario, 
the economy reaches close to full employment. After a reasonable period of 
persistently low unemployment conditions, Kalecki (1943, p. 329) maintains that 
business leaders demand a contraction in government spending, i.e., a return to 
a laissez-faire regime.5 This policy demand is driven by potential socio-political 
changes that are linked to lasting low unemployment. The negative demand 
shock of this public investment contraction directly harms employment, and 
thereafter, real wages and growth; leading to a recession. 
It follows that capitalists’ preferences regarding the extent of government 
intervention can generate cycles in a wage-led demand regime. For example, at 
the peak of the cycle, the reserve army of labor becomes depleted; job insecurity 
decreases, and workers’ bargaining power peaks. Labor’s short-term goal of 
economic “survival” has been achieved and, collectively, labor hopes to influence 
government policy. But a downward cycle is induced as the capitalist class 
undermines labor’s solidarity by lobbying for a return to a laissez-faire regime. 
This “laissez-faire shock” brings macroeconomic instability and workers shift 
their focus to short-term economic goals; i.e., the struggle to retain their jobs. 
In a sense, capitalists’ rising socio-political uncertainty leads them to sacrifice 
4  In practice, the post-WWII deployment of the welfare state shows that Kalecki’s assertion about that 
particular issue is not entirely correct, inasmuch as even consumption subsidies may be acceptable.
5  Sawyer (1985, p. 140) contends that such a reasonable period is “…much more than the two or three 
years of the boom part of the business cycle,” whilst Streeck (2011) argues that the point at which 
capitalists react adversely cannot be accurately predicted as it is subject to historical circumstances. 
A historical example of such a “reasonable period” could be the post-WWII “Golden Age” era.
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sales in the short-term (i.e. profitability) to secure the current balance of power 
in the long-term. By “current balance of power” we mean that capitalists are 
the only social class that is cohesive enough to effectively advance its policy 
agenda. As the economy sinks back into recession in the absence of government 
intervention, the fiscal policy agenda debate arises again, and the cycle repeats 
itself (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Kalecki's Political Business Cycle
source: authors’ compilation
Neoclassical PBC models
For several decades, Kalecki’s contribution and the issue of PBCs in general 
was overlooked both by neoclassical and heterodox economists. Nordhaus 
(1975, p. 182) revisited the issue of politically-driven cycles by rejecting 
Kalecki’s assumption of capitalists’ disproportional control over government. 
The economy in this early formal model is constituted of identical voters 
and opportunistic policymakers/political parties. The objective of voters is 
to minimize a Phillips-curve-based, unemployment-inflation-trade-off loss 
function, whilst political parties want to maximize the probability of re-election 
and are indifferent in terms of economic policy. Policy is conducted based on an 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve, which indicates that an unanticipated 
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increase in money supply may boost employment in the short term. Given 
that framework, Nordhaus argues that, as elections approach, policy makers 
attempt to decrease unemployment through monetary policy shocks to enhance 
their chances of re-election. As the election period passes, the government’s 
opportunistic incentive to actively fight unemployment vanishes, and as a 
result, a slump follows. Later on, Hibbs (1977) modified Nordhaus’ model by 
incorporating more sophisticated political parties, which do have preferences 
about target unemployment and inflation rates due to their political ideologies. 
Now, identical voters’ loss function is also affected by the policy agenda of each 
party as well. Accordingly, Hibbs’ model exhibits cycles due to the partisan 
policy preferences of the ruling party. When a left-wing party is in power, its 
ideology indicates a more expansionary monetary policy approach, while a 
right-wing government’s ideology centers on keeping inflation low. 
Both opportunistic (Nordhaus 1975) and partisan (Hibbs 1977) PBC 
models have been criticized for including “naïve” non-rational voters and for 
their exclusive focus on monetary policy (Drazen 2001). The rise of rational 
expectations and information asymmetry approaches within the neoclassical 
tradition affected the evolution of PBC models too. Alesina (1987) alters Hibbs’ 
partisan model by incorporating rationally adjusted inflation expectations, 
which implies that the impact of pre-election monetary shocks will be even 
more short-lived. Moreover, Rogoff and Sibert’s (1988) and Rogoff’s (1990) 
influential opportunistic PBC models embody voters with rational expectations, 
but also incomplete information about fiscal policy’s consequences. During the 
pre-election period, policymakers take advantage of voters’ ignorance about the 
long-run deficit implications of expansionary monetary policy, which eventually 
leads to cycles in economic activity. 
As shown in the previous sub-section, for Kalecki (1943) the PBC is driven 
endogenously by the feedback among fiscal policy, demand, and capitalists’ 
struggle to preserve their control over government. Evidently, the neoclassical 
PBC models neglect the role of social class conflict, effective demand, and 
socio-economic uncertainty by concentrating exclusively on exogenous drivers, 
such as the timing of elections and voters who minimize purely economistic, 
non-behavioral loss functions. Still, no formal PBC model exists outside the 
neoclassical tradition – neither in a growth, nor in a system dynamics modelling 
context – especially along the lines of Kalecki’s assumptions of wage-led 
demand and the disproportional influence of the ruling class over public policy.
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KALECKI’S PBC AS AN ENDOGENOUS CRISIS THEORY
In the past, political economists and social scientists have discussed several 
aspects of Kalecki’s PBC, but none provide a detailed explanation of its 
endogenous mechanics (see previous section) or a formal model. Feiwel (1974) 
and Sawyer (1985) narratively discussed  the main aspects and implications of 
Kalecki’s arguments, whereas Arestis and Skuse (2003) debated the relevance of 
his contribution with respect to the current policy agenda and the development 
of the financial sector. Oddly enough, the discussions of Feiwel (1974), Sawyer 
(1985), and Arestis and Skuse (2003) involved the exogenous impact of election 
cycles, among other things, in accordance with Nordhaus (1975). This is unlike 
Kalecki (1943), who does not mention elections at all. More recently, Streeck 
(2011), and Blyth and Matthijs (2017) recognize the endogenous nature of 
Kalecki’s PBC, stressing the importance of the bidirectional feedback between 
politics and the macroeconomy, but these scholars have little to say about the 
precise endogenous mechanisms at work.6 
The aim of this section is to provide a simple, intuitive formal model of 
Kalecki’s PBC, building on the neo-Kaleckian wage-led demand framework 
(Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013). First, we introduce a behavioral government 
spending function into a static aggregate demand-driven model in order to 
discuss the macroeconomic implications of politically driven fiscal policy 
expansions and contractions.7 Extending such a simple closed-economy model 
through the inclusion of a Kaleckian behavioral government spending function, 
we derive the following aggregate demand function:
 Y = C(Y,WS,Gcs)+I(Y,WS)+G(ρ) (1)
where  is output,  is consumption,  is private investment,  is government 
expenditure,  is the wage share,  is government expenditure in the form of 
consumption subsidies, while  is the capitalists’ degree of opposition to more 
expansionary fiscal policy. Following the Kaleckian growth literature (Lavoie 
and Stockhammer 2013), we assume that demand is wage-led. Accordingly, 
an increase in real wages boosts consumption (∂C/∂WS>0) due to workers’ 
6  Boddy and Crotty (1975) also discuss Kalecki’s PBC, recognizing that it is endogenous, and study 
empirically such short-run cycles in the US economy, but their analysis relies upon the Marxian 
profit-led framework which contradicts Kalecki’s wage-led assumption, as shown earlier.
7  The Kaleckian growth literature largely overlooks fiscal policy, with the exception of Obst et al. 
(2017) who incorporate the impact of fiscal policy into an open-economy, Bhaduri-Marglin (1990) 
model, focusing on estimating the cross-country effects of changes in government spending and 
income distribution, in a panel data context.
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higher marginal propensity to consume and simultaneously harms investment 
through lower profitability (∂ρ/∂E>0). The wage-led hypothesis implies that 
consumption is more sensitive to functional income distribution shocks than 
investment (|∂C/∂WS|>|∂I/∂WS|), therefore higher wage shares stimulate 
economic growth. Apparently, demand level (Y) has a positive multiplier effect 
on both components of private domestic demand, i.e. ∂C,∂I/∂Y>0. 
As argued in Section 2, the driving force of fluctuations in our model is 
capitalists’ ever-changing opposition to government intervention (ρ). Class 
conflict among industrial capitalists, rentiers, and workers has been at the core 
of the political economy approach; however, the capitalists-government nexus 
remains relatively unexplored. Our main contribution is the introduction of a 
behavioral government spending function in which the parameter  negatively 
affects public spending (∂G/∂ρ<0), as Kalecki (1943) contends. Furthermore, 
we purposely incorporate only one parameter, depicting Kalecki’s view on 
capitalists’ disproportional power over public policy decisions. We do not 
include any parameter for workers’ influence, assuming that at this stage it is 
negligible. Later on, we argue that this complexity comes into the picture at 
the peak of the PBC and is the trigger for the change in the stance of capitalists 
against government intervention.
 At this stage, a reasonable question is how the capitalist class derives its power 
over each government. Kalecki himself stresses that capitalists influence fiscal 
policy decisions by advocating their interests through their “economic experts.” 
Such a strategy has been identified as an important lobbying tactic, among others, 
in the corporate politics literature (Hillman and Hitt 1999). McMenamin (2012) 
suggests that firms may act pragmatically in terms of their politics, rather than in 
a partisan way, attempting to influence public policy through lobbying, but also 
through cash donations to the entire political spectrum. The empirical part of 
this study reports empirical evidence that shows how Australian and Canadian 
firms tend to act pragmatically, funding ideologically diverse parties. A similar 
argument has also been presented by Tripathi et al. (2002). These scholars claim 
that more powerful social groups, like large corporations, prefer to directly 
promote their agendas by funding different political parties, rather than relying 
on election cycles. Goerres and Höpner (2014) also confirm empirically the 
argument that firms are politically pragmatic, providing econometric evidence 
that shows how automobile firms in Germany chose to distribute their donations 
to the entire political spectrum between 1984 and 2005. In a more recent paper, 
Tahoun and Vasvari (2016) report similar empirical findings concerning the 
political contributions of private financial institutions in the USA. It follows that 
Kalecki’s early argument about capitalists’ disproportionate power over public 
policy finds empirical support, contradicting the fundamental assumptions 
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of Nordhaus (1975), Hibbs (1977), and the contemporary neoclassical PBC 
modelling literature, which neglect agents’ heterogeneity, power, and politics. 
Henceforth, for the purpose of this model, we define a capitalist-dependent 
government à la Kalecki, as the institution that, in principle, ought to actively 
pursue macroeconomic stability through fiscal policy,8 but which is confined by 
ruling class policy preferences. In contrast to Hibbs, in this model ideological 
differences among political parties are of minor importance.9 As a further step, 
we assume that the composition of total government spending is of the following 
form:
 G= Gi+Gcs+c (2)
where Gi is public investment, and  is the remaining constant part, which 
represents the minimum expenditure required for government’s basic functions 
(e.g. ministry staff). Though Kalecki (1943, p. 326) mentions consumption 
subsidies as a non-acceptable measure of expansionary fiscal policy based on 
the Golden Age experience (Glyn et al. 1990), we consider that government 
may use both types of demand-oriented fiscal policy tools. Imposing the classic 
hypothesis that workers do not save, a rise in consumption subsidies (GCS) leads 
to an equal increase in total consumption (C); i.e., ∂C/∂GCS>0. To close our 
model, we must specify the distribution of factor income shares (WS), capitalists’ 
opposition to government intervention (ρ), and the employment rate (E):
 WS=WS(E) (3)
 ρ=ρ(E) (4)
 E=E(Y) (5)
The wage share is a function of the reserve army of labor, depending 
positively on the employment rate (∂WS/∂E>0), as the risk of labor substitution 
decreases when the employment rate rises. Given the analysis of Kalecki’s 
PBC in Section 2, parameter ρ also depends positively on the employment rate 
(∂ρ/∂E>0) since a persistently high employment rate indicates fiercer socio-
political class conflict, i.e., increased political uncertainty for the ruling class. 
8  For example, the European Union (EC 2000) has explicitly defined full employment as one of its 
primary macroeconomic goals.
9  Indeed, the recent economic policy debate regarding the Eurozone crisis has shown emphatically 
how politically restricted governments are, regardless of their ideologies.
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Last, the employment rate is assumed to be endogenously determined by the 
level of output (∂E/∂Y>0).
Along the lines of our interpretation of Kalecki’s PBC, we begin our scrutiny 
from the secular stagnation stage where demand is in “freefall” and government 
still does not intervene.10 As demand decreases, the employment rate falls 
as well, leading to further reductions in real wages due to the reserve army 
effect. Under a wage-led regime, the fall in the labor share hampers growth 
through relatively stronger negative consumption effects. In this respect, with 
the economy in decline – due to our assumption of endogenously-determined 
employment – the ruling class’ opposition to government intervention (ρ) 
gradually diminishes. From a microeconomic perspective, in a wage-led regime 
constantly shrinking demand deteriorates capitalists’ economic prospects and 
they temporarily abandon their idealistic anti-interventionist logic to achieve 
their short-term economic goals, i.e., sales. While ρ falls, the government is 
encouraged/lobbied to exercise more drastic fiscal policy. Accepting Kalecki’s 
(1943, pp. 328-329) argument on the ineffectiveness of purely supply-side policies, 
we focus exclusively on the effects of demand-side policy tools, i.e. public 
investment and consumption subsidies. An increase in the former has a direct 
positive effect on employment,11 which means that the size of the reserve army 
decreases, and labor’s bargaining power rises. In turn, this process positively 
affects real wages and boosts consumption expenditure and growth. As argued 
above, under the assumption that workers do not save, the case for consumption 
subsidies is straightforward, since they have a direct positive impact on total 
consumption. This dual positive demand shock also has second-round effects 
through multiplier effects on consumption and investment that trigger wage-led 
recovery. Needless to say, the process of macroeconomic stabilization cannot be 
achieved at once, so government actively sustains aggregate demand, as long as 
capitalists’ resistance remains low. 
Figure 2. Fiscal policy-driven wage-led recovery
source:  authors’ compilation
10  This means ; i.e., that government spends nothing more than the minimum required.
11  We presume that these public investment projects hire unemployed workers, rather than compete 
with private firms to hire their current employees.
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As the economy reaches and remains at (near) full capacity, a behavioral 
change occurs at the microeconomic level: both social classes shift their focus to 
their long-term political goals. Capitalist opposition to government intervention 
begins to rise once again inasmuch as workers start gaining class consciousness 
and attempt to establish their own channel of influence over government. The 
workers’ goal at this stage is to pursue favorable structural reform. In the 
technical terms of our model, this can be translated into a potential restructuring 
of the government spending equation, which would include a second behavioral 
parameter for the working class’ power over public policy. As highlighted 
earlier, since such a political procedure is time-consuming, capitalists re-
focus on their long-term political goals in order to avoid this transformation, 
capitalizing on their preexisting relationship with government. Ergo,  steadily 
rises, as the ruling class becomes “boom tired,” inducing simultaneous cutbacks 
in public investment and consumption subsidies. Ceteris paribus, this dual 
government spending contraction has two direct implications: First, a decrease 
in employment; Second, the direct shrinkage of total consumption expenditure. 
The rise in unemployment deteriorates the bargaining position of workers, thus 
real wages fall. Given our wage-led demand assumption, this shift in functional 
income distribution towards profits leads to a slowdown in accumulation. 
Thereafter, investment and consumption expenditure decline further due to the 
multiplier effects, triggering economic downturn.
Figure 3. Government-spending-contraction-induced recession
source:  authors’ compilation
This change in capitalists’ stance against government intervention is 
interpreted as their political endeavor to maintain the current institutional 
setting, i.e., the current balance of power. This has been identified as one of 
the main objectives of firms’ politics (e.g. Hall 1986; Fligstein 2001; Hall and 
Thelen 2009; Jullien and Smith 2011). The main contribution of this paper is 
that it assigns the role of the driver of an endogenous PBC to this particular 
behavioral assumption. Empirically, the idea of a government spending-driven 
cycle is not irrelevant; for instance, it is consistent with the experience in the 
USA over the period 1970-2001. According to Sherman (2015, pp. 116-118), 
public spending induced the business cycle upswings during that era, with 
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government expenditure peaking before output. This is similar to the Kaleckian 
political business cycle described above.
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY, 
ENDOGENOUS CRISES, AND POWER FROM A 
GROWTH MODEL PERSPECTIVE 
Introducing the government sector, following Kalecki (1943), into the neo-
Kaleckian demand-driven model has important implications for the growth 
model perspective in comparative political economy. Baccaro and Pontusson 
(2016) challenge the relevance of the dominant paradigm in comparative 
political economy, i.e., the “Varieties of Capitalism” approach (Hall and Soskice 
2001), pinpointing that it overlooks the role of income distribution. Instead, they 
reasonably claim that cross-country discrepancies can be better understood 
from a growth model perspective; i.e., through the analysis of the relative effects 
of changes in income distribution on the components of aggregate demand, 
building on the growth model of Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). However, an 
important shortcoming is that they do not consider explicitly the role of politics 
and government spending – as the authors themselves note.12 Accordingly, 
Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) do not discuss how income distribution affects 
class struggle, fiscal policy, and political instability within the growth model 
approach. We have addressed this issue by explicitly introducing the interaction 
between class conflict and government intervention into the growth model 
framework. Our perspective offers important insights about endogenous crises, 
power, and political instability.
In profit-led demand regimes, where investment is more sensitive than 
consumption to changes in income distribution, rising social and economic 
inequality leads to economic efficiency, but through a socially unsustainable 
growth model. Hence, the prerequisite for economic growth in profit-led 
economies creates the conditions for a social crisis. Contrariwise, in wage-led 
demand regimes decreasing social and economic inequality gives rise to an 
economically stable growth model. However, as outlined in the previous sections, 
prolonged economic stability and economic equality increase capitalists’ 
political uncertainty, thus from their point of view it is politically unsustainable. 
This perspective highlights that a social democratic, pro-labor agenda may face 
opposition in both regimes but for different reasons. In profit-led economies, 
12  In a more recent paper, Baccaro and Pontusson (2018) discuss politics but with a focus on partisan 
politics (Hibbs 1977) rather than following Kalecki’s class conflict-based politics.
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squeezing wages engenders both economic efficiency and more power for the 
capitalist class. In wage-led economies, there is a trade-off between economic 
efficiency and power, depending on the phase of the cycle. 
Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) in their empirical discussion argue that the 
transition from Fordism to neoliberalism was a transformation of demand 
regimes from wage-led to profit-led (private-investment-driven). However, this 
argument does not find empirical support. The majority of econometric studies 
on demand regimes show that demand was wage-led in most economies during 
the Fordist regime as well as in neoliberalism (e.g. Stockhammer and Stehrer 
2011; Onaran and Galanis 2014; Stockhammer et al. 2018). Karabarbounis and 
Neiman (2014, p. 70) report evidence that the wage share has declined since 
the mid-1970s; i.e., since the rise of neoliberalism on a global scale.13 If the 
neoliberal regime has been profit-led, then the decreasing wage share would 
have resulted in higher growth. Yet, the global growth rate appears to have 
followed a declining trend since 1973, as reported in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Global growth rate (%), 1960-2017 
source: World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.kd.zg)
13  The authors report that this also holds at the individual country level over the same period, 
providing evidence for the USA, China, Japan, and Germany (Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014, 
p. 71).
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According to our model and given the empirical results of the demand regimes 
literature, the 1970’s crisis was not a purely economic crisis, but rather a political 
one. As demand has been wage-led, our thesis is that the 1970’s crisis was the 
outcome of the shift from the pro-labor policies of the Fordist era  to the pro-
capital policies of neoliberalism. For instance, evidence for such a politically-
motivated policy shift during that period in the USA is provided by Akard 
(1992). Also, Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972, pp. 172-188) report a pro-capital policy 
shift in the UK in the late 1960s – early 1970s, arguing that it was the capitalist 
class’ response to workers’ growing political power during the golden age. In 
this regard, we argue that neoliberalism can be seen as the downward phase of a 
Kaleckian PBC, the upward phase of which was the Fordist era.
CONCLUSIONS
During the past four decades, political business cycle models have grown 
significantly (Dubois 2016), building on the contributions of Nordhaus (1975) 
and Hibbs (1977), rather than on Kalecki’s (1943) original work. Such models do 
depart from the purely economistic nature of most formal models by including 
the impact of politics on macroeconomic policy, but they still treat the political 
system as exogenous. More precisely, the neoclassical PBC models generate 
cycles because of two exogenous factors: (1) The timing of elections, which 
encourages government to enhance its prospects of re-election through fiscal 
expansion, and (2) The ideology of the ruling political party. In contrast, as 
argued in this paper, Kalecki perceived PBCs as endogenous cycles driven by the 
ruling class’ varying resistance against government intervention, which in turn 
depends on the bidirectional feedback between the state of the macroeconomy 
and the political balance of power between workers and capitalists. Recently, 
the endogenous nature of Kalecki’s PBC has been acknowledged by political 
economists from the fields of economic sociology and global political economy 
(Streeck 2011; Blyth and Matthijs 2017), but, until now, none has scrutinized the 
precise channels through which this cycle operates or provided a formal model. 
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. It provides a precise 
explanation of how Kalecki’s PBC works, demonstrates why it is fundamentally 
different from the neoclassical PBC models, and formalizes it in the context 
of a neo-Kaleckian demand-driven growth model. The boom phase of the 
cycle is triggered by capitalists’ decreasing opposition to fiscal expansion as 
wage stagnation in a wage-led economy leads to a slowdown in accumulation, 
increasing their economic uncertainty. The downturn of the cycle is induced by 
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the ruling class’ increasing opposition to government spending, which increases 
workers’ political power at the peak of the cycle and, by extension, political 
uncertainty for the capitalist class. In other words, capitalists become “boom 
tired” for political rather than economic reasons. The central mechanism is 
that capitalists have disproportionate power over government policy through 
lobbying and Super Political Action Committees during all phases of the business 
cycle. Thus, business cycles emerge because of capitalists’ attempts to strike 
a balance between economic uncertainty – during the downturn phase – and 
political uncertainty – during the boom-peak phases – through the manipulation 
of fiscal policy in order to preserve the pro-capital institutional setting. 
We argue that future macro models must build on the state-economy 
embeddedness hypothesis and account for endogenous political factors that can 
affect macroeconomic performance, and vice versa. Further, possible extensions 
of our model include the incorporation of central banks’ monetary policy rule/s 
and the relationship between Kalecki’s PBC and the rise of populism and the 
far-right.
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